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Abstract
Despite increasing popularity, quality improvement programs (QIP) have had modest and variable impacts on
enhancing the quality of physician practice. We investigate the heterogeneity of physicians’ preferences as a
potential explanation of these mixed results in France, where the national voluntary QIP – the CAPI – has
been cancelled due to its unpopularity. We rely on a discrete choice experiment to elicit heterogeneity in
physicians’ preferences for the financial and non-financial components of QIP. Using mixed and latent class
logit models, results show that the two models should be used in concert to shed light on different aspects
of the heterogeneity in preferences. In particular, the mixed logit demonstrates that heterogeneity in preferences is
concentrated on the pay-for-performance component of the QIP, while the latent class model shows that physicians
can be grouped in four homogeneous groups with specific preference patterns. Using policy simulation, we compare
the French CAPI with other possible QIPs, and show that the majority of the physician subgroups modelled
dislike the CAPI, while favouring a QIP using only non-financial interventions. We underline the importance of
modelling preference heterogeneity in designing and implementing QIPs.
Keywords: General practitioners, Discrete choice experiment, Mixed logit, Latent class logit, Quality improvement
programs, Policy simulation
JEL classification: I11, I18, C25
Highlights
 We combine latent class and mixed logit models to
study heterogeneity in general practitioners’
preferences elicited from a discrete choice experiment
 We demonstrate that general practitioners exhibit
substantive heterogeneity in preferences for
quality improvement programs, notably for
pay-for-performance
 We show that the majority of physicians dislike the
implemented pay-for-performance program, and
would favour non-financial interventions
Background
Quality improvement programs (QIP) are an increasingly
popular approach for enhancing the quality of physician
practice in ambulatory care [1–3]. However, available
evidence suggests that QIPs, whether they focus on or
combine financial, non-financial or organizational com-
ponents, have modest and variable impacts on quality
of care [4–6]. Beyond methodological differences in the
studies, this observed heterogeneity results from the
target and design of the QIPs, as well as from variability
in physicians’ responsiveness to the programs [7–10].
Within a single program, differences in physicians’ re-
actions may be explained by differences in contextual
constraints, as well as knowledge or attitudes regarding
the QIP [9, 10].* Correspondence: mehdi.ammi@carleton.ca1School of Public Policy and Administration, Carleton University, River
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Physicians’ preferences for QIP are particularly import-
ant given that, in many cases, physicians’ participation is
voluntary and, thus, necessary to ensure the success of the
program. From 2009 to 2011, the French Statutory Na-
tional Health Insurance implemented a voluntary QIP
program (Contract for Improved Individual Practice –
CAPI) aimed at general practitioners (GP), which com-
bined pay-for-performance (P4P) and quarterly perform-
ance feedback. While the program could only increase
their income, only one-third of all French GPs had regis-
tered a year and a half after the program’s implementation,
and the program was subsequently cancelled due to its
unpopularity1. While GPs’ ethical concerns with the pro-
gram design was one key explanation of the low take-up
of the CAPI [11], a QIP better designed to meet physi-
cians’ work-related needs may have been more successful.
Health economists have thoroughly studied physicians’
preferences regarding their job characteristics [12, 13],
sometimes accounting for preference heterogeneity [14–16].
Yet, no studies, to the best of our knowledge, have spe-
cifically examined physicians’ preferences for QIPs and
their components. While recent studies have focused
on designs of QIPs that would be effective irrespective
of the targeted physicians [6, 17, 18], understanding
these physicians’ preferences may allow for fine-tuning
of the programs and improve acceptance. Moreover,
understanding the heterogeneity of physicians’ prefer-
ences about QIPs may help policymakers tailor and
diversify their programs to better match the needs of
their targeted population.
The objectives of this study are precisely to elicit het-
erogeneity in physicians’ preferences for the components
of QIPs; and by policy simulation, to compare the po-
tential and differential impact on physician welfare of
various QIPs, including the French CAPI. To do so, we
conduct a discrete choice experiment (DCE) on a sam-
ple of French GPs.
Methods
Data and the discrete choice experiment
DCE design
Discrete choice experiments are widely used in the health
economics literature to assess preferences [19]. Our study
followed the recommended steps [20] as described below.
The first step of a DCE is to select the attributes of
interest and their levels. We selected attributes based
on a literature review on QIPs and on two criteria: sup-
posed efficacy suggested by the literature and credibility
of application in the French health care context (see
Table 1). For concreteness, we focused on preventive
care, a key quality indicator. Following the same two
above criteria, a level for each attribute was defined to
reflect the CAPI. The relevance of the list of attributes,
of their number and of their levels was confirmed in a
focus group of ten representative GPs [21]2. This led to
a final list of eight attributes presented in Table 2.
The second step is to combine attributes into choice
sets. Most of time, the combination relies on experi-
mental plan theory since a full factorial design implies
proposing too many choices to respondents [22] – 864
scenarios in our case. Using JMP software, we generated
an orthogonal design [23] that resulted in 24 scenarios
and achieved the properties of orthogonality and level
balance. All other analyses are done with STATA. In order
Table 1 Interventions used in quality improvement programs for GPs
Component of the QIP Justification
Financial component
Amount of payment The literature suggests a threshold of 5 % of the doctors’ income as a minimum for the incentive to be effective [52].
Method of remuneration Financial incentives can improve the quality of care, but depend on the method and frequency of payment [6, 53]a.
The three remuneration methods used in France are pay-for-performance (P4P), fee-for-service (FFS) and a kind of
partial capitation known as a forfaitb.
Non-financial component
Clinical guidelines The efficacy of clinical guidelines is ascertained [54]. However, the kind of guideline used matters, and guidelines to
which individual clinicians have contributed may be more effective in changing their behaviour [55].
Feedback on activity Performance feedback, where physicians get quantitative feedback relate to their practice, increases quality of care [56].
Continuing education Participation in continuing education increases adherence to clinical recommendations [57].
Organisational component
Type of practice There is an association between group practice and better quality of care [58, 59].
Non-physician provider Quality of care is improved by cooperation of GPs with non-physician providers such as nurses [60].
aThis point is subject to debate. Another study finds no effect of the frequency of P4P [61]. However, representative GPs in the focus group cited the importance
of this attribute
bThe French forfaits are a partial capitation payment that represents a small part of GPs income (6 % of income [62] for certain patients (chronically ill) or for the
coordination and continuity of care). They complement the FFS but are absolutely not designed as a major payment. For example, the GP receives 40 euros a year
for following each patient classified by the health insurance plan as chronically ill (forfait pour affection de longue durée (ALD)). In comparison, sector 1 GPs are
paid 23 euros for each consultation at the physician’s office
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to facilitate respondents’ choices, we relied on a common
comparator selected from these 24 scenarios, ensuring
that this reference scenario is not strictly dominant a
priori [24]. Choice sets were constructed by pairs which
resulted in 23 choices between pairs of combinations of
quality interventions. The 23 choice sets were randomly
divided into four blocks so that each respondent made 5
or 6 choices [25]3. To limit non-response and the
subsequent loss of statistical efficiency, we did not include
an opt-out possibility. An example of choice set is pro-
vided in Appendix 1.
Finally, the DCE was pilot tested with a focus group of
self-employed GPs to validate the attributes phrasing
and then pre-tested (n = 100 GPs) to verify that the
reference scenario was not strictly dominant.
Data
The DCE questionnaire is composed of three parts. In
the first part, questions regarding the GP’s opinion about
health care reforms in general practice and the public
health role of GPs are used as a warm-up. The second
part is the choice experiment. The third part collects
sociodemographic and professional information about
each GP. The questionnaire is self-administered during
the summer of 2009 in a postal survey with one repeated
attempt for non-response.
The population under study consists of all the GPs in
active practice in one French geographic region4 (N =
1368). After the pre-test, the questionnaires were sent to
the 1268 remaining physicians. 303 questionnaires were
returned completed, resulting in a response rate of 22 %.
This response rate is consistent with other DCE studies
[26–28] and with self-administered postal surveys to
French general practitioners [29].
GPs working in a rural setting are slightly overrepre-
sented in our sample (see Table 3). The responding GPs
are also more active, with the weekly number of acts
being significantly higher than the national mean5. With
these exceptions, our sample compares well with the ref-
erence population. Of course, our methodology does not
allow for national representativeness.
With the exception of the level of remuneration, all
attributes of the DCE are coded using “effects coding”
Table 2 List of attributes and levels
Attributes Levels
Level of remunerationa
(annual increase)
100 Euros
6100 Euros
12,100 Euros
Method of remuneration Lump sum (forfait)
Lump sum and fee-for-service
Lump sum and pay-for-performance
Frequency of remuneration Monthly
Annually
Prevention clinical guidelines None
Participatory guidelines (participation
in their definition and application)
Pre-established guidelines
(evidence-based application)
Feedback on preventive practices Yes
No
Continuing education in
prevention
Yes
No
Type of practice Group of GPs
Solo practice
Assistance by non-physician
providers during preventive work
Yes
No
aWe retain three levels: 0, 5 and 10 %. It was not possible to propose a truly
null amount, so an amount very close to zero was proposed. French physicians
are not accustomed to thinking about their income in percentage terms, thus
the payment attribute was proposed in raw of the average income (in euros)
rather in relative terms (in percentage)
Table 3 Descriptive statistics
Variables Sample
(N = 303)
Mean value in
Bourgogne
Difference sample
and regional (p-value)
Mean value in France Difference sample and
national (p-value)
Age (mean) 51.5 51.2(a) 0.451 (n.s) 51.3(a) 0.588 (n.s.)
Gender (% of women) 27 % 30 %(c) 0.479 (n.s.) 31.2 %(b) 0.277 (n.s.)
Sector of activity (% in sector 1) 93.1 % 87.3 %(a) 0.485 (n.s.) 89.3 %(a) 0.623 (n.s.)
Rural practice (%) 44.5 % 33 %(d) 0.000 15.7 %(b) 0.000
Group practice (%) 47.5 % 39.6 %(d) 0.118 (n.s.) 44.5 %(b) 0.567 (n.s.)
Health network membership (%) 41.9 % 39 %(e) 0.496 (n.s.) Between 27 and 44 %
(5 French region)(e)
Not determined
Weekly acts (mean) 119 102.8(a) 0.000 102.4(a) 0.000
In the absence of exhaustive and homogeneous data source on private practice self-employed GPs, the regional and national values are derived from
different sources
aAll private practice GPs – 2008 data – SNIIR – source: Eco-Santé France, Régions & Départements 2015 – IRDES [63] (for the weekly activity, the number of annual
acts has been divided by 46 weeks)
bAll private practice GPs –2009 data – ADELI – [64]
cAll private practice GPs –2009 data – SNIIR – [65]
dSurvey panel of five regions (panel de médecins généralistes libéraux DREES, URML, FNORS) – 2007 data – [66]
eSurvey panel of five regions (panel de médecins généralistes libéraux DREES, URML, FNORS) – 2007 data – [67]
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[30]. We constructed the questionnaire in order to test
the symmetry [31], the completeness and the continuity
axioms [32]6 and found that the axioms are largely
respected: totally for the first, and respectively by 82 %
and 65 % of the respondents for the two other axioms.
Following current practice, we kept all the responses for
the analysis [32–34].
Econometric framework
Modelling heterogeneity
The analysis of DCE data relies on classical choice models
and random utility theory (RUT) [35]. When applying the
DCE approach, the utility of an individual n choosing
alternative i at the t choice situation can be written as
Unit ¼ Vnit þ εnit
Where Vnit ¼
X
k¼1
K
βkx
0
nitk is the deterministic part of
the utility (with k attributes), observable to the researcher
and sometimes referred to as the indirect utility, and
εnit is the unobservable, stochastic part and is treated as
random7. The individual will choose the alternative
yielding the highest utility.
The conditional logit is the most commonly used method
to analyse DCE data, but relies on restrictive assumptions
on the stochastic terms [23], fails to incorporate the panel
structure of most DCE data and does not account for
preference heterogeneity. The two principal models
that circumvent these limitations are the mixed logit
(MXL) [36, 37] and the latent class model (LCM) [38].
The choice between these two models critically depends
on expectations about the variation of preferences [39]: if
researchers expect preferences to vary greatly between
individuals, the MXL is preferred; the LCM is preferred
if individuals are thought to be grouped in homoge-
neous latent groups. However, the information the
models provide is complementary: MXL provides infor-
mation about how heterogeneity is distributed relative
to each attribute while LCM informs on the heterogeneity
among latent subgroups of physicians. Thus, we elect to
run both MXL and LCM.
The unconditional probability of a mixed model that
allows for individual-specific variation in tastes and
accounts for the panel dimension of choices is as
follows [40]:
PnI θð Þ ¼
Z
SnI f βjθð Þdβ
Where SnI βð Þ ¼
Y
t¼1
T exp β0xnitð ÞX
j¼1
J
exp β0xnjtð Þ
2
4
3
5 is the condi-
tional probability that the individual n realises a choice
sequence I = {i1,…, it}, f(β|θ) is a density function of the
individual-specific β with distribution parameters θ (see
[40] for more on the family of mixed models).
Preference heterogeneity is reflected in the density func-
tion, f(β|θ), and the distribution of β can be either con-
tinuous or discrete, implying MXL or LCM, respectively.
The other major difference between the models is
the estimation method. Each model relies on log-
likelihood maximization, with the log-likelihood given
by LL θð Þ ¼
X
n¼1
N
lnPn θð Þ . Unlike the LCM, this expres-
sion cannot be solved analytically in MXL and simulation
methods are used for approximation [38, 40].
Simulating policy
The goal of the policy simulation is to evaluate the ef-
fects of changes in the three main components of a QIP
(financial, non-financial and organizational), and we use
the compensating variation (CV) method to measure the
relative impact on GPs’ welfare of such change [41, 42].
The CV is calculated using the utility estimates com-
puted after the regressions in the following expression [41]
CV ¼ − 1
βw
ln
X
j¼1
J
exp V 0j
 
−ln
X
j¼1
J
exp V 1j
 h i
Where βw is the marginal utility of income, V 0j is the
indirect utility for each option j before the policy change
and V 1j the same after the policy change. In our case,
we consider only two policy options at a time, the CAPI
versus something else. The formula is then simplified
to [20]
CV ¼ − 1
βw
V 0j −V
1
j
h i
The question of heterogeneity is evaluated by estimat-
ing CV for each latent group of physicians with LCM.
For MXL, we compute and compare CV for the specific
attributes where GPs exhibit significantly heterogeneous
preferences (e.g. those GPs obtaining positive versus nega-
tive marginal utility from the attribute).
Model specification
We include an intercept in all models. This alternative-
specific constant (ASC) is necessary since choices are
made relative to a fixed comparator (the constant sce-
nario) [30, 42]. In our case, this ASC has no natural
interpretation and is expected to be statistically insig-
nificant [12].
When specifying a mixed logit it is critical to choose
which parameters are allowed to vary and which distribu-
tion these latter will follow. The normal and log-normal
distributions are the most commonly used for the random
coefficients [39, 40, 43]. As the log-normal distribution is
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criticised for its long right tail [37, 44], we choose the
normal distribution8.
The possibility to specify the coefficients as random is
one of the great strengths of the MXL. The ASC is fixed
since it has no reason to vary between the respondents.
Fixing the monetary attribute (the remuneration) has
several advantages [45]. In our case, the main one is the
capacity to calculate CV. The possibility of significant
preference heterogeneity in terms of remuneration can-
not be ruled out and should be considered in order to
fully understand physicians’ preferences. GPs valuing less
payment can indeed be explained in an intrinsic motiv-
ation framework, among others. We therefore run two
MXL: one with all coefficients normally distributed ex-
cept the constant and the amount of remuneration co-
efficient (MN1) and the other with only the constant
term fixed (MN2).
Without an intuitive way to choose the number of
latent classes in LCM, the decision is often made on
the basis of goodness-of-fit measures [27, 39]. We use
the Akaike (AIC), Bayesian (BIC) and consistent Akaike
(CAIC) information criteria.
The results for the selection of the number of classes
are presented in Table 4. The BIC and CAIC show that
the best fit is obtained with four classes, a number we
retain for the following analyses9.
Results
Heterogeneity in GPs’ preferences
The estimation results for the mixed logit are presented
in Table 5. The sign, significance and magnitude of
the mean coefficients are very stable between the two
models (MN1 and MN2), underlining the robustness
of the results. The ASC is not significant, indicating
that respondents have made their choice only on the
basis of the attributes in the list (so the model is correctly
specified). The estimates reveal the existence of preference
heterogeneity among GPs that is quite concentrated
around some attributes.
The standard deviations are significant for the pay-for-
performance and the assistance by NPP in model MN1.
In MN2, this is also the case for the application of
guidelines, the type of practice, and the level of remu-
neration. The heterogeneity in preferences for pay-for-
performance is particularly relevant. This remuneration
scheme is a source of marginal disutility at the mean but
is positively valued by 22 % and 24 % of physicians (in
MN1 and MN2, respectively). These figures are consist-
ent with the proportion of French GPs having chosen to
adhere to the CAPI (around 30 %, [11]). It is also worth
noting that the indifference to the assistance by NPP at
the mean masked a strong heterogeneity. Indeed, 60 to
62 % would like to benefit from this kind of assistance.
Finally, even the amount of remuneration is marked by
heterogeneity, with 14 % of physicians not valuing an
increase in income for the targeted activities (MN2).
The latent class model estimates are presented in
Table 6. Over all the classes, the ASCs are insignificant.
For the first class, the only significant attributes are con-
tinuing education and assistance by NPP. Continuing
education has a positive effect on indirect utility while
assistance by NPP has a negative one. In the second
Table 4 Selection of the number of classes for the LCM
AIC BIC CAIC Log likelihood
2 classes 1885.706 1971.1219 1994.1219 -919.8531
3 classes 1859.6501 1989.6307 2024.6307 -894.8251
4 classes 1783.5122 1958.0576 2005.0576 -844.7562
5 classes 1780.0136 1999.1239 2058.1239 -831.0069
6 classes 1787.6742 2051.3492 2122.3492 -822.83712
Table 5 Estimation of the mixed logit models
MN1 MN2
Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat
Level of remuneration Mean 0.0002*** (9.03) 0.0002*** (6.59)
SD - - 0.0003*** (7.21)
Forfait Mean -0.4706* (-2.41) -0.6635* (-2.57)
SD 0.1203 (0.41) 0.1227 (0.34)
Pay-for-performance Mean -0.5085* (-2.36) -0.6608* (-2.38)
SD 0.9771*** (5.06) 1.2575*** (6.13)
Frequency Mean 0.2652 (1.66) 0.3264 (1.69)
SD 0.0782 (0.40) 0.2098 (1.00)
Definition of guidelines Mean 0.4966* (2.35) 0.6776* (2.55)
SD 0.2992 (0.97) 0.0796 (0.36)
Application of
guidelines
Mean 0.2563 (1.24) 0.3396 (1.27)
SD 0.1060 (0.33) 0.5811* (2.06)
Continuing education Mean 0.6580*** (3.89) 0.8654*** (4.39)
SD 0.3710 (1.11) 0.0312 (0.11)
Information feedback Mean 0.4070* (2.07) 0.4801* (2.06)
SD 0.4751 (1.78) 0.1112 (0.30)
Solo practice Mean 0.3476* (2.19) 0.4902** (2.61)
SD 0.2119 (0.82) 0.4721* (2.23)
Assistance by NPP Mean 0.1057 (0.61) 0.1641 (0.78)
SD 0.9063*** (5.72) 1.2831*** (7.45)
ASC Mean 1.3462 (1.40) 1.7370 (1.51)
Number of observations 3390 3390
Number of respondents 303 303
Log Likelihood -908.4154 -879.5045
AIC 1856.8309 1801.0089
BIC 1979.4026 1929.7092
*Significant at 5 %; **significant at 1 %; ***significant at 0.1 %
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class, the significance of the attributes is slightly differ-
ent. While continuing education remains significant, this
time it has a negative effect. GPs in this class prefer
higher payment and to be paid more often, as the sign
and significance of the frequency attribute attests. They
dislike the forfait but they are indifferent to pay-for-
performance. They also prefer solo practice. All attri-
butes are significant for classes 3 and 4, however distinct
behaviour is observed. The doctors in these two latent
classes place negative value on alternative payment rela-
tive to FFS while preferring more frequent payment. They
also prefer to work in groups. They differ in respect to all
the other attributes. In contrast to the third class, an in-
crease in remuneration has a negative effect on indirect
utility in the fourth class. Class 3 physicians disvalue all
types of clinical guidelines but positively value continuing
education and information feedback, contrary to class 4.
Physicians in the fourth class value assistance by NPP
while those in the third class do not. With the preference
for group practice in both classes, this result suggests a
preference for physician groups only in class 3 while
multidisciplinary teams are preferred in class 4.
At this point it is worth comparing the results of the
two kinds of models. One of the major conclusions,
holding in both MXL and LCM, is the negative impact
on indirect utility of an increase in remuneration ob-
served for some GPs. It shows that this result is not only
a matter of statistical artefact resulting from the use of
a normal distribution in the MXL [39]. The MXL
underlined heterogeneity of preferences for P4P. This
heterogeneity is also found in the LCM, with the third
and fourth classes disliking this payment while the co-
efficient is positive in the second class (but significant
only at 10 %). The strong difference in preferences for
assistance by NPP found in MXL is also seen in LCM.
The negative coefficients in classes 1 and 3 are con-
trasted by a strong positive preference in class 4. All in
all, this suggests a stability of the main conclusions
made from the different models, with preference het-
erogeneity remaining among classes.
Regarding the goodness of fit of the models, results in
Table 7 indicate very little advantage to LCM while
MXL (MN2) has better BIC. The minimal difference
between the best fitting models suggests that each pro-
vides relevant information on the heterogeneity of GPs’
preferences.
Table 6 Estimation of the latent class logit model – 4 classes
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4
Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat
Level of remuneration -0.0001 (-1.56) 0.0002*** (7.35) 0.0023*** (19.04) -0.0030*** (-18.85)
Forfait -0.2202 (-0.35) -0.8085* (-2.07) -9.6873*** (-14.26) -26.8455*** (-18.89)
Pay-for-performance -1.5179 (-1.94) 0.6209 (1.71) -24.0380*** (-29.94) -20.2301*** (-15.56)
Frequency -0.5197 (-0.84) 0.9612** (2.70) 1.2295* (2.31) 34.5608*** (34.54)
Definition of guidelines 1.8732 (1.76) -0.1382 (-0.41) -3.8807*** (-6.19) 46.0073*** (27.24)
Application of guidelines 2.0941 (1.79) 0.5921 (1.70) -14.4822*** (-22.98) 17.9852*** (19.47)
Continuing education 3.6665*** (4.51) -1.0573** (-3.13) 11.0212*** (14.31) -6.5797*** (-5.23)
Information feedback -0.6791 (-1.29) 0.1495 (0.37) 7.4359*** (8.38) -4.5607*** (-4.39)
Solo practice -1.2745 (-1.63) 1.0318*** (3.44) -3.9727*** (-7.85) -8.1784*** (-9.51)
Assistance by NPP -1.3672* (-2.32) 0.4714 (1.88) -11.7878*** (-17.33) 40.3411*** (36.88)
ASC 2.8629 (0.54) 2.7353 (1.00) -67.6568 (.) 72.4956 (.)
Average class share 0.136 0.317 0.231 0.316
Number of observations 3390
Number of respondents 303
Log Likelihood -844.7561
AIC 1779.5122
BIC 2055.2985
*Significant at 5 %; **significant at 1 %; ***significant at 0.1 %
Table 7 Goodness-of-fit measures of the different specifications
AIC BIC Log likelihood
MN1 1854.961 1977.532 -907.4804
MN2 1794.699 1923.4 -876.3496
LCM(4) 1783.5122 1958.0576 -844.75616
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Simulating alternative quality improvement programs
The policy simulation study relies on the calculation of
compensating variation. The goal is here to evaluate
the relative impact on physicians’ welfare of alternative
QIPs to the CAPI. These alternatives were chosen to be
consistent with, and believable in, the context of French
general practice.
The DCE attributes are used to depict five QIPs – the
CAPI and four alternative policies (refer to Appendix 2
for more details). The first is close to the emerging
organizational model in French primary care (maisons
pluridisciplinaires et pôles de santé) implemented to
foster quality of care, and also known in the literature as
“integrated” primary care model [46]. The second intro-
duces a mixed remuneration scheme that can better
balance quantity and quality in physicians’ activity [47].
In order to measure only the effect of the payment
scheme, we assume an increase in income similar to
the CAPI. The third QIP is composed of only non-
financial mechanisms that do not require a sharp trans-
formation in physicians’ organization (i.e. no multidis-
ciplinary team). The fourth is designed as a maximal
satisfaction policy and is used as a benchmark10. Even if
the maximum satisfaction of GPs is not necessarily an
objective per se, comparing it to the CAPI gives a sense
of the distance separating this QIP from the most desir-
able one. The details of each policy are presented in
Table 8.
The indirect utilities and the corresponding CV are
first computed for all GPs on the basis of MN1 esti-
mates. With mixed logit models, we concentrate on the
attributes which are consistently heterogeneous in the
two models (MN1 and MN2): P4P and assistance by
NPP. For each, we identify “inclined” who obtain positive
marginal utility from these attributes and “adverse” who
obtain negative marginal utility. The LCM provides nat-
ural subgroups for the estimation of CV, which are
computed in the four latent classes. It should be noted
that only the significant coefficients enter in the compu-
tation of CV for each subgroup of interest. As GPs are
indifferent to insignificant attributes, using their esti-
mate values would distort the welfare estimates. Results
are presented in Table 9.
The first striking result is that CAPI is a source of
indirect disutility in the majority of the subgroups con-
sidered (5 out of 8).
The compensating variation indicates the annual bene-
fits for GPs of choosing an alternative QIP rather than
the CAPI. P4P “inclined” have a positive indirect utility
from the CAPI of course. However, with the exception
of the mixed remuneration program, all other alternative
policies still give a greater benefit than the CAPI11. P4P
“adverse” would prefer each of the alternative policies to
the CAPI, if they were proposed. The non-financial pol-
icy has the greatest CV, but the gap with integrated
primary care is reduced. Whether they are “inclined” or
“adverse” to assistance by NPP, GPs disvalue the CAPI
and prefer all alternatives. We expected the NPP “in-
clined” to have a greater benefit from P1 because of the
multidisciplinary team but P3 is a little more valued,.
The NPP “adverse” have their lowest (though still posi-
tive) CV for P1 and their preferred alternative is the
non-financial program P3.
The patterns are very different between latent classes.
Classes 1 and 4 obtain negative and extremely negative
indirect utility from the CAPI, respectively, while the
sign is positive in classes 2 and 3. Compared to the other
subgroups, CV is very high in class 112. The benefit of
having the non-financial policy rather than the CAPI is
equivalent to 93,705€, almost the same amount as for
the maximum satisfaction program. There is no benefit
from shifting from the CAPI to the mixed remuneration
scheme. This last result holds for class 2. This class is
very specific since it is the only subgroup where other
Table 8 CAPI and alternative QIPs
CAPI Integrated primary
care model (P1)
Mixed remuneration (P2) Non-financial
interventions (P3)
Maximum
satisfaction (P4)
Level of remuneration 4200 4200 4200 0 4200
Method of remuneration Forfait and P4P Forfait Forfait and FFS No Forfait and FFS
Frequency of remuneration Annual Annual Annual No NA
Prevention clinical guidelines No Pre-established No Participatory Participatory
Continuing education in prevention No Yes No Yes Yes
Feedback on preventive practices Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Group practice No Yes No No No
Assistance by non-physician providers No Yes No No NA
In the last column, the frequency of remuneration and assistance by NPP are not considered because GPs are indifferent to it at the mean. The maximum
satisfaction is defined for all GPs. The French forfait are paid annually per patient (P1). FFS means a payment at each visit and cannot be “monthly” or “annual”,
but mixed remuneration here includes a forfait, so we select the annual frequency for P2
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policies result in losses. It is even the case for P4, designed
to be the most desirable for GPs in the whole, underlining
again the particularity of this latent group. For class 3,
mixed remuneration has the highest CV, with a relative
benefit of 18,474€. With the exception of P1, alternative
policies still dominate the CAPI. For class 4, integrated
primary care offers the highest relative benefit (53,925€)
while the CV for the non-financial policy remains im-
portant (47,148€).
Discussion and conclusion
Using a discrete choice experiment, we elicited French
GPs’ preferences for the different components of QIPs.
We showed the strength of heterogeneity in their prefer-
ences and demonstrated how this heterogeneity leads
physicians to evaluate very differently the same interven-
tions aimed at improving the quality of care. The hetero-
geneity in preferences is concentrated on some
components, especially P4P and assistance by a NPP.
There is also variation in preferences by latent groups of
GPs, with some physicians valuing some components of
QIP only (continuing education and assistance by NPP
in group 1), while other physicians value the same com-
ponents differently (group 3 versus 4). Given this hetero-
geneity, the crucial policy lesson is that QIPs could be
adapted to meet physicians’ preferences by offering a
menu of programs and allowing GPs to self-select. If
policymakers were to choose only one QIP, CV indicates
that they should implement a program using only non-
financial interventions. Yet, policymakers continue to rely
heavily on the financial dimension to change physician be-
haviour with QIP, as it is the case in France with the ROSP
– the QIP that has replaced the CAPI. Strong beliefs in
the power of the financial lever or perceptions of potential
implementation difficulties for non-financial interventions
could explain this policy choice. Another interpretation
is that financial QIP could be seen as a mechanism to
both address unavoidable compensation claims from
medical union and concerns for the quality of care.
Some limitations should be noted. First, the limited
response rate, though consistent with the DCE literature,
may have led to sample selection bias. While we do not have
information on the non-responders, the opinions expressed
in the first part of the questionnaire are reassuring in the
sense that they are quite close to those expressed in other
French studies [48–50]. Second, the use of a forced choice
design might have biased the estimates if physicians wished
to choose neither of the two proposed QIP. However, physi-
cians who were not willing to choose one of the two options
in a given choice set actually did not respond at the specific
choice occasion, the forced choice is still used in health pro-
fessional DCE studies [15], and this “forced choice” strategy
is consistent with the new orientation of the French national
QIP program (the ROSP is mandatory). Finally, we choose
to use a common comparator when we constructed the
choice set, which does not necessarily maximize the
Table 9 Policy simulation: compensating variation (Euro per year)
CAPI Integrated primary
care model
Mixed
remuneration
Non-financial
interventions
Maximum
satisfaction
All GPs Indirect utility -0.5143 0.8974 0.1594 1.9093 3.5391
CV x 9113 4349 15646 26167
P4P “inclined” Indirect utility 0.1824 1.0987 -0.7463 2.1993 3.1624
CV x 5915 -5995 13020 19238
P4P “adverse” Indirect utility -0,7121 0,8542 0,4087 1,8295 3,6504
CV x 10112 7236 16408 28163
Assistance by NPP “inclined” Indirect utility -0.7463 1.4502 -0.6057 1.6088 3.0452
CV x 14180 908 15204 24477
Assistance by NPP “adverse” Indirect utility -0.3814 0.2714 1.1420 2.1565 4.1030
CV x 4214 9835 16384 28951
Class 1 Indirect utility -1.9848 2.6139 -1.9848 5.0337 5.3483
CV x 61397 0 93705 97905
Class 2 Indirect utility 2.0676 -2.9193 2.0676 -0.0255 0.9140
CV x -22293 0 -9357 -5157
Class 3 Indirect utility 7,0764 -5,0059 49,9679 22,3915 65,8679
CV x -5204 18474 6596 25323
Class 4 Indirect utility -152.8812 6.3605 -76.4541 -13.6526 45.8256
CV x 53925 25881 47148 67290
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statistical efficiency of the experimental design [22]. Yet,
fixed comparator increases the “respondent efficiency”,
which can be defined as the capacity of a respondent to
express his “real” preferences in the context of the DCE
[51]. Given that private practice physicians are heavily
time-constrained, particularly in the French fee-for-
service context, we believe this trade-off between statis-
tical and respondent efficiency has allowed us to obtain
a satisfactory response rate and better quality and com-
pleteness of responses relative to other designs.
Despite these limitations, this study adds to the broader
literature on the heterogeneity of health professionals’
preferences [13–15, 28] and for the first time, combines
LCM and MXL approaches. Each model contributes a
better understanding of physicians’ preferences and using
such an approach can help policymakers to better design
their QIP.
Endnotes
1The CAPI was replaced in 2012 by a P4P program
(the ROSP) where physicians are enrolled automatically,
but can request to opt out.
2The number of considered attributes should not be so
high as to allow respondent to make trade-offs. If there
are no clear recommendations on the maximum num-
ber, the DCE health economics literature generally uses
at most eight attributes [21].
3Caussade et al. [25] showed that setting between 6
and 13 choice situations minimizes the error variance of
the estimates.
4We restricted ourselves to the region of Bourgogne
because of prior relationships with the regional health
professional’s union who facilitated the constitution of
the focus-group and offered logistic support for the sur-
vey. The restriction to one region is also due to monet-
ary and time constraints. The fund obtained from the
Conseil Regional de Bourgogne did not allow for a survey
of more than one region.
5This point is, however, not particularly concerning as
the regional and national values are derived from an
administrative database (système national d’information
inter-régimes – SNIIR) known to underestimate physi-
cians’ activity. The SNIIR includes the very low activity
physicians, pulling down the average number of acts.
6Beyond the choice exercise, supplementary choices and
follow-up questions were introduced in the DCE in order to
test the internal validity of the data collected. More informa-
tion on the test procedures used is available upon request.
7This random part is precisely why RUT can deal with
axiomatic violations. The “errors” may come from this
stochastic part, which is unexplained by the researcher.
8Because of the qualitative nature of the majority of
our attributes, there is no reason to think that one level
should be preferred to another a priori. It is therefore
difficult to select the sign of the distribution. MXL with
log-normal distribution are run for sensitivity analyses
and do not exhibit large differences in the fit. Results are
available from the authors.
9The simplest way to account for heterogeneity of
preferences is to incorporate the personal characteristics
of the respondents in the models. It can be done with
interaction terms in the MXL and to explain class mem-
bership probability in the LCM. We argue these individ-
ual characteristics have to considerably improve the fit
of the models in order to be worth keeping for final ana-
lysis, which is not the case with our data (results available
upon request). Most of the personal characteristics are
found to be insignificant in the MXL, the integration of
these characteristics does not drastically improve the fit
to the data in MXL, and even worsens the fit of the
LCM. As a result and following Hole [39], we focus
only on the more parsimonious models in our analyses.
10The maximal satisfaction policy is designed for all
GPs. Our goal is to compare different nationally uniform
policies such as the CAPI.
11In this paragraph, when talking about greater CV, we
do not take the maximum satisfaction into account and
only concentrate on the reliably implantable policies.
12This is partly because only two attributes are found
significant for this latent class and enter the calculation
of the CV. Their presence or absence therefore has a
disproportionate impact on the CV for each policy.
Appendix 1
Table 10 Example of choice set
Option A Option B
Income increase per year 6100€ 12100€
Method of remuneration Forfait + Fee-for-
service
Forfait + Pay-for-
performance
Frequency of remuneration Annually Annually
Work in group of general
practitioners
Yes No
Prevention clinical guidelines None You participate in
their definition and
application
Continuing education in
prevention
No Yes
Feedback on preventive
practices
No No
Assistance by non-physician
providers during preventive
work
No Yes
I prefer A I prefer B
Tick one box □ □
Note: Translated from French
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